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Abstract
We study the communication efficient secret sharing (CESS) problem. A classical threshold
secret sharing scheme encodes a secret into n shares given to n parties, such that any set of at least
t, t < n, parties can reconstruct the secret, and any set of at most z, z < t, colluding parties
cannot obtain any information about the secret. A CESS scheme satisfies the previous properties
of threshold secret sharing. Moreover, it allows to reconstruct the secret from any set of d, d ≥ t,
parties by reading and communicating the minimum amount of information. In this paper, we
introduce two explicit constructions of CESS codes called Staircase Codes. The first construction
achieves optimal communication and read costs for a fixed d, d ≥ t. The second construction
achieves optimal costs universally for all possible values of d, t ≤ d ≤ n. Both constructions
are designed over a small finite field GF (q), for any prime power q > n. We also describe how
Staircase codes can also be used to construct threshold changeable secret sharing with minimum
storage cost, i.e., minimum share size.
1 Introduction
Consider the threshold secret sharing (SS) problem [1, 2] in which a dealer encodes a secret using
random keys into n shares and distributes them to n parties. The threshold SS allows a legitimate user
contacting any set of at least t, t < n, parties to reconstruct the secret by downloading their shares.
In addition, the scheme ensures that any set of at most z, z < t, colluding parties cannot obtain any
information, in an information theoretic sense, about the secret. The following example illustrates the
construction of a threshold SS on n = 4 shares.
Example 1 (Threshold SS). Let n = 4, t = 2 and z = 1 and let s be a secret uniformly distributed over
GF (5). Then, the following 4 shares (s + r, s + 2r, s + 3r, s + 4r) form a threshold SS scheme, with
r being a random symbol, called key, chosen uniformly at random from GF (5) and independently of s.
A user can decode the secret by contacting any t = 2 parties, downloading their shares and decoding s
and r. Secrecy is ensured, because the secret is padded with the key in each share.
Threshold secret sharing code constructions have been extensively studied in the literature, e.g.,
[1–7]. The literature on secret sharing predominantly studies non-threshold secret sharing schemes,
with so-called general access structures, e.g., [8–10]. We refer the interested reader to the following
survey works [11–13] and references within. In this paper, we focus on the problem of communication
(and read) efficient secret sharing (CESS). A CESS scheme satisfies the properties of threshold secret
sharing described in the previous paragraph. In addition, it achieves minimum communication and read
overheads when the user contacts d, d ≥ t, parties. The communication overhead (CO) is defined as the
extra amount of information (beyond the secret size) downloaded by a user contacting d parties in order
1
to decode the secret. The read overhead RO is defined similarly. Next, we give an example of a CESS
code that minimizes CO and RO. The CESS code in this example belongs to the family of Staircase
codes which we introduce in Section 3.1.
Example 2. Consider again the SS problem of Example 1 with n = 4, t = 2, z = 1. We assume now
that the secret s is formed of 2 symbols s1, s2 uniformly distributed over GF (5) and we use two keys
r1, r2 drawn independently and uniformly at random from GF (5). To construct the Staircase code, the
secret symbols and keys are arranged in a matrix M as shown in (1). The matrix M is multiplied by
a 4 × 3 Vandermonde matrix V to obtain the matrix C = VM . The 4 rows of C form the 4 different
shares and give the Staircase1 code shown in Table 1.

s1 r1s2 r2
r1 0

 .


1 1 1
1 2 4
1 3 4
1 4 1


V
M
C = VM = (1)
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4
s1 + s2 + r1 s1 + 2s2 + 4r1 s1 + 3s2 + 4r1 s1 + 4s2 + r1
r1 + r2 r1 + 2r2 r1 + 3r2 r1 + 4r2
Table 1: An example of a CESS code based on the Staircase code construction over GF (5) for n = 4
parties, threshold t = 2, z = 1 colluding parties and any d = 3 parties can efficiently reconstruct the
secret. A user contacting any t = 2 parties downloads all their shares, i.e., 4 symbols in total, in order to
decode the secret. The resulting overheads are CO = RO = 2 symbols. However, a user contacting any
d = 3 parties decodes the secret by downloading the first symbol (in blue) of each share, i.e., 3 symbols
in total. Hence, CO = RO = 1 symbol. For instance, a user contacting parties 1, 2 and 3 downloads
s1 + s2 + r1, s1 + 2s2 + 4r1, and s1 + 3s2 + 4r1 and can decode the secret and r1. Notice that a user
contacting d = 3 parties can only decode r1, whereas a user contacting t = 2 parties has to decode r1
and r2.
The CESS scheme enjoys the following properties. First, a user decodes the secret either by con-
tacting any t = 2 parties and downloading all their shares, i.e., 4 symbols, or by contacting any d = 3
parties and downloading the first symbol (in blue) of each share, i.e., 3 symbols in total. The key idea
here is that the user is only interested in decoding the secret and not necessarily the keys. When d = 3,
the user decodes the secret and only the key r1, whereas when d = t = 2, the user has to decode the
secret and both of the keys. This code actually achieves the minimum CO and RO equal to 1 symbol for
d = 3 (and 2 symbols for d = t = 2) given later in (4) and (5). Second, secrecy is achieved because
the secret s1, s2 is padded by random keys r1, r2 and each z = 1 party cannot obtain any information
about s1 and s2.
Related work: The CESS problem was introduced by Wang and Wong in [14] where they focused on
perfect CESS, i.e., the case in which z = t− 1. The authors showed that there exists a tradeoff between
the number of contacted parties d and the amount of information downloaded by a user in order to
decode the secret. They derived a lower bound on CO and constructed codes for the special case of
1The nomenclature of Staircase codes comes from the position of the zero block matrices in the general structure of the
matrix M (see the general construction in Table 3).
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z = t − 1 using polynomial evaluation over GF (q), where q > n + v, that achieve minimum CO and
RO universally for all d, t ≤ d ≤ t+ v − 1, for some positive integer v. Zhang et al. [15] constructed
CESS codes for the special case of z = t− 1 over GF (q), where q > n, that achieve minimum CO and
RO for any fixed d, t ≤ d ≤ n. Recently, Huang et al. [16] studied the CESS problem for all z < t and
generalized the lower bound on CO. The authors constructed explicit CESS codes for any z achieving
the minimum CO and RO for d = n over GF (q), q > n(n−z). Moreover, they proved the achievability
of the lower bound on CO and RO universally for all possible values of d, t ≤ d ≤ n using random linear
code constructions2 . In our setting, we assume that the dealer has direct access to all the parties. In the
case where the dealer can access the parties through a network, Shah et al. [19] studied the problem of
minimizing the communication cost of securely delivering the shares to the parties.
Contributions: In this paper, we introduce two new classes of explicit constructions of linear CESS
codes that achieve minimum CO and RO. More specifically, we make the following contributions:
1. We describe a construction, which we call Staircase Code, that achieves minimum CO and RO for
any given z and any given d. This construction generalizes the construction in Example 2.
2. We describe a universal construction, which we call Universal Staircase Code, that achieves min-
imum CO and RO simultaneously for all possible values of d, t ≤ d ≤ n and any given value of
z.
Moreover, we describe how to construct a class of secret sharing codes, called threshold changeable
secret sharing (TCSS) codes [20], based on the introduced Staircase codes.
The Staircase codes require a small finite field GF (q) of size q > n, which is the same requirement for
Reed Solomon based SS codes3 [3].
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate the CESS problem, intro-
duce the necessary notations and summarize our results. We describe the Staircase code constructions in
section 3. In section 4, we prove that the Staircase codes for a fixed d achieve secrecy and minimum CO
and RO. In section 5, we prove that Universal Staircase codes achieve secrecy and minimum CO and RO.
In Section 6 we show how to use the Staircase codes to construct threshold changeable secret sharing.
We conclude in section 7.
2 Problem formulation and main results
We consider the CESS problem and follow the majority of the notations in [16]. A secret s of size
k units is formed of kα symbols (1 unit = α symbols). The secret symbols are drawn independently
and uniformly at random from a finite alphabet, typically a finite field. A CESS code is a scheme that
encodes the secret, using random keys, into n shares w1, . . . , wn, of unit size each, and distributes them
to n distinct parties. Let Wi denote the random variable representing the share of party i, let S denote
the random variable representing the secret s, let [n] = {1, . . . , n}, and for any subset B ⊆ [n] denote
by WB the set of random variables representing the shares indexed by B, i.e., WB = {Wi; i ∈ B}.
Then, a CESS code must satisfy the following properties:
1. Perfect secrecy: Any subset of z or less parties should not be able to get any information about
the secret. The perfect secrecy condition can be expressed as
H(S |WZ) = H(S), ∀Z ⊂ [n] s.t. |Z| = z. (2)
2After the appearance of the original version of this work on Arxiv [17], an equivalent CESS code construction for all
parameters was given independently in [18].
3However, the constructions requires to divide the secret into a certain number of symbols, which may not be necessary for
SS codes.
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2. MDS: A user downloading any t shares is able to recover the secret, i.e.,
H(S |WA) = 0, ∀A ⊆ [n] s.t. |A| = t. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that the secret can be of at most t− z units (see [16, Proposition 1]).
We will take the secret to be of maximum size, i.e., k = t− z units.
3. Minimum CO and RO: a user contacting any d parties, t ≤ d ≤ n, is able to decode the secret by
reading and downloading exactly k + CO(d) units of information in total from all the contacted
shares, where
CO(d) =
kz
d− z
. (4)
Equation (4) represents the achievable information theoretic lower bound [14, Theorem 3.1], [16, The-
orem 1] on the communication overhead, CO(d), needed to satisfy the constraints in (2) and (3), when
the user contacts d parties4. Since the amount of information read cannot be less than the downloaded
amount, the following lower bound on RO holds,
RO(d) ≥ CO(d). (5)
We will refer to a CESS code described above as an (n, k, z, d) CESS code, where the threshold is
t = k + z. For instance, the code in Example 2 is an (4, 1, 1, 3) CESS code. We define a universal
(n, k, z) CESS code that achieves minimum CO(d) and RO(d) simultaneously for all possible values
of d. Note that the MDS constraint can be omitted since it is subsumed by the minimum CO and RO
constraint since it corresponds to the case of d = t and CO(t) = z. However, we will make this
distinction for clarity of exposition.
Given the model described above, we are ready to state our two main results.
Theorem 1. The (n, k, z, d) Staircase CESS code defined in Section 3.1 over GF (q), q > n, satisfies the
required MDS and perfect secrecy constraints given in (2) and (3), and achieves optimal communication
and read overheads CO(d) and RO(d) given in (4) and (5) for any given d, d ∈ {k + z, . . . , n}.
Theorem 2. The (n, k, z) Universal Staircase CESS code defined in Section 3.2 over GF (q), q > n,
satisfies the required MDS and perfect secrecy constraints given in (2) and (3), and achieves optimal
communication and read overheads CO(d) and RO(d) given in (4) and (5) simultaneously for all d,
k + z ≤ d ≤ n.
3 Staircase code constructions
3.1 Staircase code construction for fixed d
We describe the (n, k, z, d) Staircase code construction that achieves optimal communication and read
overheads CO(d) and RO(d) for any given d, k + z ≤ d ≤ n. In this construction, we take α = d − z.
Hence, the secret s of size k units is formed of k(d − z) symbols s1, . . . , skα, where si ∈ GF (q) and
q > n. The symbols si are arranged in an α × k matrix S . The construction uses zα iid random keys
drawn uniformly at random from GF (q) and independently of the secret. The keys are partitioned into
two matrices R1 and R2 of dimensions z × k and z × (α − k) respectively. Let D be the transpose
4Note that a user contacting d parties and achieving (4) for a threshold secret sharing with threshold t downloads the same
amount of information as a user contacting d parties in a threshold secret sharing with threshold d.
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of the last (α − k) rows of the matrix
[
S
R1
]
5 and let 0 be the all zero square matrix of dimensions
(α − k) × (α − k), note that α − k ≥ 0 since d ≥ z + k. The key ingredient of the construction
is to arrange the secret and the keys in a d × α matrix M defined in Table 2. The inspiration behind
this construction is the class of Product Matrix codes that minimizes the repair bandwidth in distributed
storage systems6 [22].
M =


S
D
R2
R1
0


d×α
α−kk
α
z
k
z
α−k
Table 2: The structure of the matrix M that contains the secret and keys in the Staircase code construc-
tion for fixed d.
Encoding: Let V be an n × d Vandermonde7 matrix defined over GF (q). The matrix M , defined in
Table 2, is multiplied by V to obtain the matrix C = VM . The n rows of C form the n different shares.
Decoding: A user contacting any t = k+ z parties downloads all the shares of the contacted parties. A
user contacting d parties, indexed by I ⊆ [n], downloads the first k symbols from each contacted party
corresponding to vi
[
S R1
]t
, i ∈ I (the superscript t denotes the transpose of a matrix). Theorem 1
guaranties that the user will be able to decode the secret in both cases.
Example 2 (Continued). We give the details of the construction of the (n, k, z, d) = (4, 1, 1, 3) CESS
code of Example 2. We take α = d − z = 2, thus the secret s is formed of kα = 2 symbols s1, s2
uniformly distributed over GF (q), q = 5 > n = 4. The construction uses zα = 2 iid random keys
r1, r2 drawn uniformly at random over GF (5) and independently of the secret. The keys are partitioned
into two matrices R1 and R2 of dimensions z × k = 1× 1 and z × (α− k) = 1× 1, respectively. The
matrix D is the transpose of the last α − k = 1 row of R1. Hence, we have, R1 = D = r1, R2 = r2,
and S =
[
s1
s2
]
. The secret and the keys are arranged in a d × α = 3 × 2 matrix M . Let V be an
n× d = 4× 3 Vandermonde matrix. M and V are given again in (6).
M =

s1 r1s2 r2
r1 0

 and V =


1 1 1
1 2 4
1 3 4
1 4 1

 . (6)
The shares are the rows of the matrix C = VM as given in Table 1. We want to check that this code
satisfies the following properties:
1) Minimum CO and RO for d = 3: We check that a user contacting d = 3 parties can reconstruct the
secret with minimum CO and RO. For instance, if a user contacts the first 3 parties and downloads the
5If α− k ≤ z, i.e., d ≤ 2z + k, then D consists of the transpose of the last α− k rows ofR1.
6After the appearance of the original version of this work on Arxiv [17], a connection between the family of regenerating
codes and CESS codes was explored in more details in [21].
7We require all square sub-matrices formed by consecutive columns of V to be invertible. Vandermonde and Cauchy
matrices satisfy this property.
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first symbol of each contacted share, then the downloaded data is given by,

1 1 11 2 4
1 3 4



s1s2
r1

 . (7)
The matrix on the left is a 3 × 3 square Vandermonde matrix, hence invertible. Therefore, the user can
decode the secret (and r1). This remains true irrespective of which 3 parties are contacted. The user
reads and downloads 3 symbols of size 3/α = 3/2 units resulting in minimum overheads, CO(3) =
RO(3) = 3/2 − k = 1/2, as given in (4) and (5).
2) MDS: We check that a user contacting t = k+ z = 2 parties can reconstruct the secret. Suppose the
user contacts parties 1 and 2 and downloads all their shares given by
[
1 1 1
1 2 4
]s1 r1s2 r2
r1 0

 . (8)
The system in (8) is equivalent to the two following systems
[
1 1 1
1 2 4
]s1s2
r1

 and
[
1 1
1 2
] [
r1
r2
]
. The
decoder uses the latter system to decode r1 and r2. This is possible because the matrix on the left is
a square Vandermonde matrix, hence invertible. Then, the decoder subtracts the obtained value of r1
from the former system to obtain again the following invertible system
[
1 1
1 2
] [
s1
s2
]
. The decoder then
decodes s1 and s2. Again, this procedure is possible for any 2 contacted parties .
3) Perfect secrecy: At a high level, perfect secrecy is achieved here because each symbol in a share is
“padded” with at least one distinct key statistically independent of the secret, making the shares of any
party independent of the secret.
3.2 Universal Staircase code construction
We describe the (n, k, z) Universal Staircase code construction that achieves optimal communication
and read overheads CO(d) and RO(d) simultaneously for all possible values of d, i.e., k + z ≤ d ≤ n.
Let d1 = n, d2 = n − 1, . . . , dh = k + z, with h = n − k − z + 1, and αi = di − z, i = 1, . . . , h.
Choose α = LCM(α1, α2, . . . , αh−1), that is the least common multiple of all the αi’s except for the
last αh = k. The secret s consists of kα symbols s1, . . . , skα, uniformly distributed over GF (q), q > n,
arranged in an α1 × kα/α1 matrix S .
The construction uses zα iid random keys, drawn uniformly at random from GF (q) and independently
of the secret. The keys are partitioned into h matrices Ri, i = 1, . . . , h, of respective dimensions
z × kα/αiαi−1 (take α0 = 1). The matrices R1, . . . ,Ri consist of the overhead of keys decoded by a
user contacting di parties. We form h matrices Mi, i = 1, . . . , h, as follows,
M1 =

 S
R1

 , M2 =

D1R2
0

 , . . . , Mj =

Dj−1Rj
0

 , . . . , Mh =

Dh−1Rh
0

 .
kα/α1 kα/α1α2 kα/αj−1αj α/αh−1
n
z
α1
n z
α2
1
n z
αj
n − dj
n z
k
h − 1
(9)
Each matrix Dj is formed of the (n− j + 1)th row of
[
M1 M2 . . .Mj
]
wrapped around to make a
matrix of dimensions αj+1 × kα/αjαj+1 for j = 1, . . . , h − 1. The 0’s are the all zero matrices used
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M =


D2
. . . Dh−1
D1 Rh
S R3
. . .
R2
0
R1 0
. . .
0


.
staircase
structure
n× α
M1 M2 M3 . . . Mh
Table 3: The structure of the matrix M that contains the secret and keys in the universal Staircase code
construction.
to complete the Mi’s to n rows. The secret and the keys are arranged in the matrix M =
[
M1 . . .Mh
]
defined in Table 3.
The matrix M is characterized by a special structure resulting from carefully choosing the entries
of the Dj’s and placing the all zero sub-blocks in a staircase shape, giving these codes their name. This
staircase shape allows to achieve optimal communication and read overheads CO and RO for all possible
d.
Encoding: The encoding is similar to the Staircase code construction. Let V be an n× n Vandermonde
matrix defined over GF (q). The matrix M , defined in Table 3, is multiplied by V to obtain the matrix
C = VM . The n rows of C form the n different shares.
Decoding: To reconstruct the secret, a user contacting any dj parties indexed by I ⊆ [n] downloads the
first kα/αj symbols from each contacted party corresponding to vi
[
M1 . . .Mj
]
, for all i ∈ I .
We postpone the example of a Universal Staircase code to section 5.1 to have it next to the proof of
Theorem 2.
4 Staircase Code for fixed d
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the (n, k, z, d) Staircase code defined in Section 3.1. We prove Theo-
rem 1 by establishing the following properties of the code:
1) Minimum CO(d) and RO(d): We prove that a user contacting any d parties can reconstruct the secret
while incurring minimum CO and RO. A user contacting any d parties downloads the first k symbols of
each party. Let I ⊂ [n], |I| = d, be the set of indices of the contacted parties, then the downloaded
data is given by VI
[
S R1
]t
, where VI is a d × d square Vandermonde matrix formed of the rows
of V indexed by I , hence invertible. The user can always decode the secret (and the keys in R1) by
inverting VI . The code is optimal on communication and read overheads CO(d) and RO(d), because the
user only reads and downloads kd symbols of size kd/α = kd/(d − z) units resulting in an overhead
of kd/α − k = kz/α = kz/(d − z) achieving the optimal CO(d) and RO(d) given in (4) and (5).
2) MDS property: We prove that a user contacting any t = k + z parties and downloading all their
shares can reconstruct the secret. Let I ⊂ [n], |I| = t, be the set of indices of the contacted parties. The
information downloaded by the user is VIM and is given by,
VI

 S D
R1
R2
0

 .
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First, we show that the user can decode the entries of D and R2. The decoder considers the system,
VI
[
D R2 0
]t
= V ′I
[
D R2
]t
. (10)
Recall that the dimensions of the all zero matrix in (10) are (α−k)×(α−k), then V ′I is a (k+z)×(k+z)
square Vandermonde matrix formed by the first (k + z) columns of VI . Therefore, the user can always
decode the entries of D and R2 because V ′I is invertible. Second, we prove that the user can always
decode the entries of S and hence reconstruct the secret. Recall that D is the transpose of the last α− k
rows of M1 ,
[
S R1
]t
. By subtracting the previously decoded entries of D from VI
[
S R1
]t
, the
user obtains V ′IM ′1, where V ′I is defined above and M ′1 is a (k + z) × k matrix formed by the first
k + z rows of M1. Therefore, the user can always decode the entries of M ′1 because V ′I is invertible. If
k + z ≥ α, then S is directly obtained since it is contained in M ′1. Otherwise, M ′1 consists of the first
k + z rows of S . The remaining rows of S are contained in D and were previously decoded. In both
cases, the user can decode all the secret symbols s1, . . . , skα.
3) Perfect secrecy: We prove that for any subset Z ⊂ [n], |Z| = z, the collection of shares indexed
by z, denoted by WZ = {wi, i ∈ Z}, does not reveal any information about the secret as given in
equation (2), i.e., H(S | WZ) = H(S). Let R denote the random variable representing all the random
keys, then it suffices to prove that H(R | WZ ,S) = 0 as detailed in the Appendix. Therefore, we need
to show that given the secret s as side information, any collection of z shares can decode all the random
keys. A collection of WZ shares can be written as
VZ

 S D
R1
R2
0

 , (11)
where VZ is a z × d matrix corresponding to the rows of VZ indexed by Z . The linear system in (11)
can be divided into two systems as follows,
VZ
[
S R1
]t
, (12)
VZ
[
D R2 0
]t
. (13)
Given the secret as side information, it can be subtracted from (12), which becomes
VZ
[
0 R1
]t
= V ′′ZR1,
where, V ′′Z is a z × z square Vandermonde matrix consisting of the last z columns of VZ . The entries
of R1 can always be decoded because V ′′Z is invertible. Now that R1 is decoded and we have S as side
information, we can obtain D as the last α− k rows of
[
S R1
]t
. Then, the entries of D are subtracted
from the second system to obtain V ∗ZR2, where V ∗Z is a z × z square Vandermonde matrix consisting of
the (k + 1)th to the (k + z)th columns of VZ . Hence, the entries of R2 can always be decoded because
V ∗Z is invertible. Therefore, H(R |WZ ,S) = 0, ∀ Z, Z ⊂ [n], |Z| = z and perfect secrecy is achieved.
5 Universal staircase codes
5.1 Example
We describe here the construction of an (n, k, z) = (4, 1, 1) Universal Staircase code over GF (q), q =
5 > n = 4, by following the construction in Section 3.2. We have d1 = 4, d2 = 3, d3 = 2 and α1 = 3,
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α2 = 2, α3 = 1 and α = LCM(α1, α2) = LCM(3, 2) = 6. The secret s is formed of kα = 6 symbols
uniformly distributed over GF (5). The construction uses zα = 6 iid random keys drawn uniformly
at random from GF (5) and independently of the secret. The secret symbols and the random keys are
arranged in the following matrices,
S =

s1 s4s2 s5
s3 s6

 , R1 = [r1 r2] , R2 = [r3] and R3 = [r4 r5 r6] .
To build the matrix M which will be used for encoding the secret, we start with
M1 =

 S
R1

 =


s1 s4
s2 s5
s3 s6
r1 r2

 .
Then, D1 is the α2 × kα/α1α2 = 2 × 1 matrix that contains the symbols of the nth row of M1,
i.e., D1 =
[
r1 r2
]t
. Therefore, M2 =
[
D1 R2 0
]t
=
[
r1 r2 r3 0
]t
. Similarly, we have
D2 =
[
s3 s6 r3
]
and M3 =


s3 s6 r3
r4 r5 r6
0 0 0
0 0 0

. We obtain M by concatenating M1, M2 and M3,
M =


s1 s4 r1 s3 s6 r3
s2 s5 r2 r4 r5 r6
s3 s6 r3 0 0 0
r1 r2 0 0 0 0

 .
M1 M2 M3
(14)
Here, V is the n× n = 4× 4 Vandermonde matrix over GF (5) given in (15). The shares are given by
the rows of the matrix C = VM and shown in Table 4.
V =


1 1 1 1
1 2 4 3
1 3 4 2
1 4 1 4

 . (15)
Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4
s1 + s2 + s3 + r1 s1 + 2s2 + 4s3 + 3r1 s1 + 3s2 + 4s3 + 2r1 s1 + 4s2 + s3 + 4r1
s4 + s5 + s6 + r2 s4 + 2s5 + 4s6 + 3r2 s4 + 3s5 + 4s6 + 2r2 s4 + 4s5 + s6 + 4r2
r1 + r2 + r3 r1 + 2r2 + 4r3 r1 + 3r2 + 4r3 r1 + 4r2 + r3
s3 + r4 s3 + 2r4 s3 + 3r4 s3 + 4r4
s6 + r5 s6 + 2r5 s6 + 3r5 s6 + 4r5
r3 + r6 r3 + 2r6 r3 + 3r6 r3 + 4r6
Table 4: An example of a universal Staircase code for (n, k, z) = (4, 1, 1) over GF (5).
The constructed Universal Staircase code satisfies the following properties:
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1) MDS: We check that a user contacting d3 = k + z = 2 parties can decode the secret. Suppose that
the user contacts parties 1 and 2. The data downloaded by the user is V{1,2}M and is given by,
[
1 1 1 1
1 2 4 3
]


s1 s4 r1 s3 s6 r3
s2 s5 r2 r4 r5 r6
s3 s6 r3 0 0 0
r1 r2 0 0 0 0

 .
M1 M2 M3
V{1,2}
(16)
We will show that the user can decode the secret by successively solving the linear systems V{1,2}M3,
V{1,2}M2 and V{1,2}M1. The decoder starts by considering V{1,2}M3 which gives,
[
1 1
1 2
] [
s3 s6 r3
r4 r5 r6
]
. (17)
The matrix on the left is invertible, and the user can decode the secret symbols and keys in (17). Then,
the decoder considers the system V{1,2}M2 after subtracting from it the value of r3 decoded in the pre-
vious step. The obtained system is again invertible and the decoder can decode r1 and r2. The decoder
then considers V{1,2}M1, after canceling out r1, r2, s3, s6 decoded so far, to obtain the following
system, [
1 1
1 2
] [
s1 s4
s2 s5
]
.
The matrix on the left is again invertible and the decoder can reconstruct the secret. This remains true
irrespective of which 2 parties are contacted.
2) Minimum CO and RO for d2 = 3 and d1 = 4: We check that a user contacting any d, d = 3, 4,
parties can decode the secret while achieving the minimum communication and read overheads given
in (4) and (5). Suppose a user contacts d2 = 3 parties indexed by I ⊂ [n]. The user reads and downloads
the first kα/α2 = 3 symbols of each contacted share corresponding to VI
[
M1 M2
] (in black and red),
where VI is the matrix formed by the rows of V indexed by I . The user will be able to reconstruct the
secret by implementing a decoding procedure similar to the one above. The resulting CO and RO are
equal to 3/2− k = 1/2 units achieving the optimal CO(d2) and RO(d2) given in (4) and (5). In the case
when a user contacts d1 = 4 parties, the user reads and downloads the first kα/α1 = 2 symbols of each
contacted share corresponding to VIM1 (in black). The user can always decode the secret because VI
here is a 4× 4 square Vandermonde matrix, hence invertible. The resulting CO and RO are equal to 1/3
achieving the optimal CO(d1) and RO(d1) given in (4) and (5).
3) Perfect secrecy: At a high level, perfect secrecy is achieved here because each symbol in a share is
“padded” with at least one distinct key statistically independent of the secret, making the shares of any
party independent of the secret.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the (n, k, z) Universal Staircase code construction defined in Section 3.2. We prove Theorem 2
by establishing the following properties.
1) Encoding is well defined: We prove that the (n− j + 1)th row of [M1 . . .Mj] has the same number
of entries as Dj , j = 1, . . . , h − 1. Therefore, we can always construct the matrix Dj . In fact, the
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number of entries of one row of
[
M1 . . .Mj
]
is equal to the sum of the number of columns of the Mi’s,
i = 1, . . . , j. Notice that αi−1 = αi + 1, then we can write,
kα
αiαi−1
= kα
(
1
αi
−
1
αi−1
)
.
Hence, the number of columns of
[
M1 . . .Mj
]
is given by,
kα
α1
+ kα
(
1
α2
−
1
α1
)
+ · · ·+ kα
(
1
αj
−
1
αj−1
)
=
kα
αj
, (18)
which is equal to the number of entries of Dj .
2) MDS and minimum CO(d) and RO(d) for all d, k + z ≤ d ≤ n: We prove that a user contacting any
d, k+ z ≤ d ≤ n, parties can decode the secret while achieving the minimum communication and read
overheads given in (4) and (5). Notice that the MDS property follows directly from the fact that a user
contacting dh = k + z parties can reconstruct the secret by reading and downloading all the contacted
shares.
A user contacting any dj , j = 1, . . . , h, parties downloads the first kα/αj symbols of each party.
Let I ⊆ [n], |I| = dj , be the set of indices of the contacted parties and let VI be the matrix formed of
the rows of V indexed by I . The total downloaded data is given by VI
[
M1 . . .Mj
]
and can be divided
into j linear systems given as follows,
VIM1 = VI
[
S R1
]t (19)
VIM2 = VI
[
D1 R2 0
]t (20)
.
.
.
VIMj−1 = VI
[
Dj−2 Rj−1 0
]t (21)
VIMj = VI
[
Dj−1 Rj 0
]t
. (22)
We prove by induction that the user can always reconstruct the secret by iteratively decoding Mi,
i = j, . . . , 1, in each linear system VIMi. To that end, we verify the induction hypothesis for i = j.
Given the system in (22), we show that the user can always decode Mj . The zero block matrix in (22) is
of dimensions (n− dj)× (kα/αjαj−1). Therefore, (22) can be rewritten as V ′I
[
Dj−1 Rj
]
, where V ′I
is the square Vandermonde matrix of dimensions dj × dj formed by the first dj columns of VI . Hence,
the user can always decode the entries of Mj by inverting V ′I .
Next, suppose that the user can decode all the Mi’s, i = j, . . . , l + 1, we prove that the user can
always decode Ml. The lth system is given by VIMl. By construction Ml contains dl non-zero rows,
because the 0 block matrix is of dimensions (n− dl)× (kα/αlαl−1). In addition, the entries of the last
l− 1 non-zero rows of Mj are present in Df for f = j − 1, . . . , l − 1, which were previously decoded.
It can be checked that dj = dl − (l − 1) for all l < j. Therefore, after subtracting the last l − 1 rows
of Ml, the system becomes V ′IM ′l , where V ′I is again the dj × dj square Vandermonde matrix defined
above and M ′l is the matrix formed of the first dj = dl − (l − 1) rows of Ml. Henceforth, the user can
always decode M ′l by inverting V ′I . Finally, the user can decode all the entires of Ml that consist of the
entries of M ′l and the entries of the last l − 1 rows of Ml, which were previously decoded.
Next, we show that minimum CO and RO are achieved. The number of symbols read and downloaded
by a user contacting dj parties is equal to dj(kα/αj) symbols which corresponds to djk/αj units. Then,
the communication and read overheads are given by djk/αj−k = kz/αj = kz/(dj−z), which matches
the optimal CO(dj) and RO(dj) for all dj = k + z, . . . , n, given in (4) and (5).
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3) Perfect secrecy: Similarly to the proof of perfect secrecy in Theorem 1, we need to show that H(R |
WZ ,S) = 0 for all Z ⊂ [n], |Z| = z (see Appendix). This is equivalent to showing that given the secret
s as side information, any collection WZ of z shares can decode all the random keys. A collection of
WZ of z shares can be written as VZ
[
M1 . . .Mh
]
, which can be divided into h = n− k − z + 1 linear
systems as follows,
VZM1 = VZ
[
S R1
]t (23)
VZM2 = VZ
[
D1 R2 0
]t (24)
.
.
.
VZMh = VZ
[
Dh−1 Rh 0
]t
. (25)
We will prove by induction that given the secret s as side information, any collection WZ of z shares
can always iteratively decode Ri, i = 1, . . . , h, in each linear system VZMi. To that end, we verify the
induction hypothesis for i = 1 by showing that a collection of WZ shares can always decode R1 in (23).
Recall that the dimensions of R1 are z × kα/α1. Given the secret s, (23) becomes,
VZ
[
0 R1
]t
= V ′′ZR1,
where V ′′Z is a z × z square Vandermonde matrix formed by the last z columns of VZ . Therefore, R1
can be decoded by inverting V ′′Z .
Next, we suppose that any collection of WZ shares can decode all the Ri’s for i = 1, . . . , l− 1, and
show that any collection ofWZ can decode Rl. The lth system is given by VIMl = VI
[
Dl−1 Rl 0
]t
.
By construction, Dl−1 consists of the entries of the last row of Ml−1 which were previously decoded.
Given the previously decoded information, any collection of WZ shares can cancel out the entries of
Dl−1 to obtain V ∗ZRl. Since the dimensions of Rl are z × kα/αlαl−1, the matrix V ∗Z is a z × z square
Vandermonde matrix formed by the (αl+1)th to (αl+z)th rows of VZ . Thus,Rl can be always decoded
because V ∗Z is invertible. Therefore, all the keys can always be decoded. Hence, H(R | WZ ,S) = 0.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
∆-Universal Staircase codes: Note that the construction of Universal Staircase codes can be modified
to construct Staircase codes that achieve minimum CO and RO only for a desired subset ∆ of all possible
d’s, i.e., ∆ ⊆ {k + z, . . . , n}. We refer to these codes as (n, k, z,∆) ∆-universal Staircase codes. The
advantage of these codes over universal codes is that they may require smaller number of symbols per
share α.
Encoding: Let ∆′ , ∆ \ {k + z} and order the d’s in ∆′ in decreasing order. We write ∆′ =
{di1 , . . . , di|∆′|} ⊆ {d1, . . . , dh−1}, where di1 > di2 > · · · > di|∆′| . Let αij = dij − z for all dij ∈ ∆
′
and let α = LCM(α1, . . . , α|∆′|). Define di|∆′|+1 , k+ z and αi|∆′|+1 , k. The secret symbols are ar-
ranged in a matrix S of dimensions αdi1×kα/αdi1 and the random keys are partitioned into the matrices
Ri1 , . . . ,Ri|∆′|+1 , of dimensions z × kα/αi1 for Ri1 and z × kα(αij − αij−1)/(αijαij−1) for all other
Rij , j = 2, . . . , |∆
′| + 1. Construct Mi1 as the di1 × kα/αi1 matrix structured as M1 in (9). And, for
each dij , j = 2, . . . , |∆′|+1, construct Mij as the di1 × kα(αij −αij−1)/(αijαij−1) structured as Mij
in (9). The matrixDij , j = 1, . . . , |∆′|, is the matrix of dimensions αij+1×kα(αij+1−αij )/(αij+1αij )
containing the last dij − dij+1 rows of
[
Mi1 . . .Mij
]
, from row dij to row dij+1 +1. Then, concatenate
the constructed matrices, Mi1 , . . . ,Mi|∆′|+1 , to obtain the matrix M of dimensions di1 ×α. The matrix
M is multiplied by a Vandermonde matrix of dimensions n× di1 to obtain the shares.
Decoding: To reconstruct the secret, a user contacting any dij parties, indexed by I ⊆ [n], downloads
the first kα/αij symbols from each contacted party corresponding to vi
[
Mi1 . . .Mij
]
, for all i ∈ I .
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Corollary 1. Let ∆ ⊆ {k + z, . . . , n}. The (n, k, z,∆) ∆-universal Staircase codes defined above
over GF (q), q > n, satisfies the required MDS and perfect secrecy constraints given in (2) and (3)
and achieves optimal communication overhead CO(d) and read overhead RO(d) given in (4) and (5)
simultaneously for all d, d ∈ ∆.
We omit the proof of Corollary 1 since it follows the same steps of the proof of Theorem 2.
6 Threshold changeable secret sharing
An (n, k, z; t′) threshold changeable secret sharing (TCSS) code, defined in [20], is an (n, k, z) secret
sharing scheme (satisfying (2) and (3)), where the threshold t = k + z can be changed to t′ > t in a
decentralized way without the dealer. The parties are allowed to communicate as long as the security
constraint is not violated. The efficiency of a TCSS is measured by the new share size for the new
threshold t′, which we refer to as the storage cost (SC) of the scheme8. Different variants of threshold
changeable secret sharing schemes have been studied in the literature, see e.g., [23–25]. A connection
between TCSS and CESS is shown in [14]. Code constructions are provided in [14, 15, 20] for the case
when z = t− 1 and the threshold t′ is given a priori.
In this section, we show how to construct an (n, k, z; t′) TCSS code for a given t′ > t using an
(n, k, z, d = t′) Staircase code. However, different values of t′ for the same (n, k, z) may require
different Staircase codes. We show that this can be avoided by constructing what we call an (n, k, z; [t+
1 : n]) Universal TCSS code using an (n, k, z) Universal Staircase code. Both constructions involve the
parties deleting parts of their shares and do not require communication among the parties. Moreover,
this construction achieves the optimal storage cost (SC)
SC =
k
t′ − z
, (26)
which is the minimum share size required if the dealer were present. The next example shows how to
construct an (n, k, z; [t + 1 : n]) Universal TCSS code with optimal SC from an (n, k, z) Universal
Staircase code by deleting parts of each share.
Example 3. Consider the problem of constructing an (n, k, z; [t + 1 : n]) = (4, 1, 1; [3 : 4]) Universal
TCSS code for all possible t′, i.e., t′ = 3 and 4. To this end, we use an (n, k, z) = (4, 1, 1) Universal
Staircase code constructed in Section 5.1. The shares given to each party are depicted in Table 5.
In our construction, to change the threshold from t = k + z to any t′, t′ ∈ {t + 1, . . . , n}, each
party deletes the last t
′ − z − k
t′ − z
α symbols of its share. Recall that in CESS, each share is of unit size
and consists of α symbols (α symbols = 1 unit). In this example, to change the threshold from t = 2 to
t′ = 3, each party deletes the last 3 symbols (in shaded blue) of its share. The obtained code achieves
the minimum Storage Cost (SC) given in (26), because each new share is of size 3 symbols equal to 1/2
unit. One can verify that a user contacting any t′ = 3 parties and downloading their new shares can
decode the secret.
Similarly, the same code can be used to change the threshold from t = 2 to t′ = 4. Each party
deletes the last 4 symbols (in red and shaded blue) of its original share (or deletes the last symbol, in
red, if the threshold was already changed to 3). Each new share consists of 2 symbols equal to 1/3 unit.
Hence, the obtained code achieves minimum Storage Cost (SC) given in (26). One can verify that a user
downloading all the shares can decode the secret. In both cases, secrecy is inherited from the Staircase
code, because the parties do not exchange any information when changing the threshold.
8Any secret sharing scheme is trivially threshold changeable, because a user contacting t′ > t parties can decode the secret
by downloading any t shares. However, it does not achieve minimum storage cost for the new threshold.
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Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4
s1 + s2 + s3 + r1 s1 + 2s2 + 4s3 + 3r1 s1 + 3s2 + 4s3 + 2r1 s1 + 4s2 + s3 + 4r1
s4 + s5 + s6 + r2 s4 + 2s5 + 4s6 + 3r2 s4 + 3s5 + 4s6 + 2r2 s4 + 4s5 + s6 + 4r2
r1 + r2 + r3 r1 + 2r2 + 4r3 r1 + 3r2 + 4r3 r1 + 4r2 + r3
s3 + r4 s3 + 2r4 s3 + 3r4 s3 + 4r4
s6 + r5 s6 + 2r5 s6 + 3r5 s6 + 4r5
r3 + r6 r3 + 2r6 r3 + 3r6 r3 + 4r6
N
ew
sh
a
re
for
t
′
=
3
D
el
et
ed
Table 5: A (4, 1, 1; [3 : 4]) Universal TCSS code obtained from an (4, 1, 1) Universal Staircase code
over GF (5). The original code has threshold t = k + z = 2 and can be changed to either t′ = 3 or
4. The threshold change from t = 2 to t′ = 3 is depicted. Each party deletes the last 3 symbols of its
share. Similarly, the threshold can be changed to t′ = 4 by keeping the first two symbols of each share.
In both cases, the obtained code achieves minimum storage cost (SC) (share size) given by (26).
Corollary 2. An (n, k, z; t′) TCSS code, respectively an (n, k, z; [t + 1 : n]) Universal TCSS code,
can be constructed using an (n, k, z, d) Staircase code defined in Section 3.1, respectively an (n, k, z)
Universal Staircase code defined in Section 3.2. To change the threshold from t = k+z to t′, each party
deletes the last t
′ − k − z
t′ − z
α symbols of its share. Both constructions achieve optimal storage cost (SC)
given in (26).
Proof. We prove that an (n, k, z; [t+1 : n]) Universal TCSS code can be constructed using an (n, k, z)
Universal Staircase code and omit the proof for (n, k, z; t′) TCSS code, since it follows the same steps.
Starting with an (n, k, z) Universal Staircase code, the threshold is t = k + z. Assume that the
threshold is to be changed to t′ for any t′ ∈ {t + 1, . . . , n}. Each party deletes the last t
′ − z − k
t′ − z
α
symbols of its share (original share size is α symbols).
We establish the following properties.
1. Minimum Storage Cost (SC): By construction, the new share size is α− (t′− z− k)α/(t′− z) =
kα/(t′ − z) symbols. Recall that each α symbols are equal to 1 unit, hence each share is of size
k/(t′ − z) units and (26) is achieved.
2. MDS in t′: By construction, after changing the threshold to t′, each party keeps exactly the
symbols that are sent to a user contacting any t′ parties in the original CESS code. Therefore, the
user can decode the secret.
3. Perfect secrecy: Since the parties do not exchange any information when changing the threshold,
perfect secrecy follows from the properties of the original Universal Staircase code.
Remark 1. Note that the Universal TCSS code obtained from our construction also minimizes the
communication and read overheads (CO and RO) in addition to minimizing the storage cost (SC). In
other words, the new n shares stored after the threshold update, allow a user contacting any d parties,
d ∈ {t′, . . . , n}, to decode the secret while achieving the minimum communication and read overheads
given in (4) and (5).
For instance, in Example 3 for the new threshold t′ = 3, a user contacting any d = 4 parties and
downloading the first two symbols (in black) of each new share can decode the secret. The incurred CO
(and RO) is equal to 2 symbols equal to 1/3 unit and is minimum, i.e., achieves (4) and (5).
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7 Conclusion
We considered the communication efficient secret sharing (CESS) problem. The goal is to minimize the
read and download overheads for a user interested in decoding the secret. To that end, we introduced
a new class of deterministic linear CESS codes, called Staircase Codes. We described two explicit
constructions of Staircase codes. The first construction achieves minimum overhead for any given num-
ber of parties d contacted by the user. The second is a universal construction that achieves minimum
overheads simultaneously for all possible values of d. The introduced codes require a small finite field
GF (q) of size q > n, which is the same requirement for Reed Solomon based SS codes [3]. Finally,
we described how Staircase codes can be used to construct threshold changeable secret sharing (TCSS)
codes.
In conclusion, we point out some problems that remain open. The model we considered here and
the proposed Staircase codes can provide security against parties corrupted by a passive Eavesdropper.
However, the problem of constructing communication and read efficient codes that provide security
against an active (malicious) adversary remains open. Moreover, constructing threshold changeable
secret sharing codes where the security level can be increased by increasing the number of possibly
colluding parties also remains open in general (only special cases were solved in [24]).
Let Wi denote the random variable representing share wi, and for any subset B ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
denote by WB the set of shares indexed by B, i.e., WB = {Wi; i ∈ B}. We prove that, for all
Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |Z| = z, the perfect secrecy constraint H(S |WZ) = H(S), given in (2), is equivalent
to H(R | WZ ,S) = 0. The proof is standard [26, 27] but we reproduce it here for completeness. In
what follows, the logarithms in the entropy function are taken base q. We can write,
H(S |WZ) = H(S)−H(WZ) +H(WZ | S) (27)
= H(S)−H(WZ) +H(WZ | S)−H(WZ | S,R) (28)
= H(S)−H(WZ) + I(WZ ; R | S) (29)
= H(S)−H(WZ) +H(R | S)−H(R |WZ ,S) (30)
= H(S)−H(WZ) +H(R | S) (31)
= H(S)−H(WZ) +H(R) (32)
= H(S)− zα+ zα (33)
= H(S). (34)
Equation (28) follows from the fact that given the secret s and the keys R any share can be decoded,
equation (31) follows because H(R | S,WZ) = 0 and equation (33) follows because the Staircase code
constructions use zα independent random keys.
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